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Abstract: In this article, a comparison is made between economic and identity 
explanations of preferences toward EU membership in the Czech Republic. 
This research demonstrates that economics rather than identity is a more pow-
erful explanation of public opinion on accession. With regard to economic 
explanations of public support for integration three models are examined 
– a winners and losers model, an international trade liberalisation model, and 
a foreign direct investment model. A comparison of these three models shows 
that support for accession was primarily based on attitudes toward foreign di-
rect investment. Moreover, contemplating employment opportunities within 
the EU following accession was also an important factor. Contrary to previous 
research the empirical evidence presented in this article suggests that being 
a winner or loser in the post-communist transition process was not the strong-
est factor explaining popular support for membership. The results presented 
should not be taken to imply that instrumental rather than ideological or af-
fect-based motivations determine general attitudes toward integration. On 
the speciﬁ c question of vote choice in the accession referendum instrumental 
economic considerations were most important.
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Introduction
Membership of the European Union (EU) was a key goal for all post-communist 
governments in the Czech Republic. Nonetheless, since the mid-1990s the Europe-
an Union issue has been one of the key dividing lines within Czech party politics, 
although it has not been a central issue during general election campaigns. While 
public opinion in the Czech Republic was consistently supportive of the process 
of accession, its level of support was one of the lowest among the ten states in the 
May 2004 enlargement [Linden and Pohlman 2003; Taggart and Szczerbiak 2004; 
Kopecký and Holsteyn 2006]. In one of the few comprehensive English-language 
accounts, Hanley [2004: 691] summarised popular support for accession as being 
based on ‘cues from longstanding positive linkages of “Europe” with democracy, 
market reform and Czech identity’. Moreover, this account stressed that the refer-
endum campaign had little effect, as citizens had for the most part made up their 
mind years earlier.
Domestic and international opinion polls reveal that a key factor for those 
sceptical about EU membership was economic concerns and more speciﬁ cally 
fears about an increase in prices and unemployment. Reservations about loss 
of national identity motivated only a very small minority of those polled [see 
Hanley 2004: 694–5]. To date there has been no systematic individual level analy-
sis of preferences in the Czech accession referendum of June 2003. This article 
aims to make a contribution to this ﬁ eld of research by examining what economic 
factors shaped attitudes toward membership prior to accession and to explore 
whether a citizen’s sense of identity also played some role.
Scholarly research on public support for European integration is primarily 
based on survey data from Western Europe that has been examined since the 
early 1970s. The question that has arisen with the two most recent waves of en-
largement is whether these ‘West European’ models of public opinion toward the 
EU are applicable to a Union of twenty-seven member states. Scepticism stems 
from the fact that in Western Europe public opinion on integration sprung from 
citizens living in stable liberal democratic polities with established market econ-
omies. Within post-communist states mass attitudes toward integration were 
grounded in polities and economies still in a process of transition where acces-
sion represented a further movement of change.
Moreover, Rohrschneider and Whiteﬁ eld [2006] argue that the current un-
derstanding of public support for integration is based on elites and masses ac-
cepting the merits of liberal democracy and free markets. Within Central and 
Eastern Europe there is still considerable resistance among political elites and 
substantial blocks of voters to unfettered capitalism [Večerník and Matějů 1999: 
185ff]. Consequently, these scholars contend that citizens within post-communist 
states do not judge the EU in terms of expected economic beneﬁ ts, but more in 
terms of underlying economic and political values. In sum, Rohrschneider and 
Whiteﬁ eld [2006: 147] contend that in post-communist states public opinion on 
integration is more ideological than instrumental.
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In this article, it will be argued that while ideological factors may be more 
important than instrumental ones in shaping general attitudes toward integra-
tion, on the speciﬁ c issue of accession economic considerations were most impor-
tant. While there are undeniably merits in questioning the dominance and nature 
of economic explanations of public support for accession in Central and Eastern 
Europe, it is certain that economics was a primary consideration during the 2004 
referendum campaigns in states such as the Czech Republic and Poland [Hanley 
2004: 694; Markowski and Tucker 2005: 427, 430].
Here we will focus our attention on the Czech Republic and examine more 
speciﬁ cally what were the economic and identity bases of popular support for EU 
membership? This raises an additional question: how do economic and identity 
factors shape public opinion toward the European Union? In the ﬁ rst section, the 
economic bases for popular support for European integration in Western Europe 
will be outlined. Thereafter, there is a brief review of the literature on public opin-
ion towards EU accession in 2004 within post-communist states. Here we outline 
three economic explanations of why the Czech public might have supported ac-
cession, and we formulate a number of testable hypotheses. This is followed in 
the third section by a discussion of how a citizen’s sense of identity is seen by 
scholars to inﬂ uence attitudes toward the integration project. In the fourth sec-
tion, there is a discussion of the data and methodology used in this paper. In the 
penultimate section, the empirical ﬁ ndings are presented and this is followed by 
some concluding remarks. 
Economic explanations of citizen support for European integration 
in Western Europe
While economic explanations of public support for European integration have 
been a dominant theme, this fact should not be taken to mean that such research 
has adopted a consistent perspective. In fact, this literature exhibits considerable 
differences in terms of the level of analysis (i.e. aggregate, individual, and multi-
level datasets) and the use of indicators (i.e. subjective and/or objective). Conse-
quently, while economic explanations may appear simple and straightforward, 
the extant literature paints a more complex picture. For example, the exact effect 
of macro-economic variables, such as the level of unemployment and inﬂ ation, 
on support for EU membership has been shown to be associated with both posi-
tive and negative orientations toward integration.
Our goal here is not to critically review the literature on economic expla-
nations, but to outline the types of models tested. Table 1 summarises the two 
main streams within this ﬁ eld of research and illustrates the differing levels of 
analysis and mechanisms underlying the key economic explanations employed. 
It should be noted that the distinction between micro- and macro-level explana-
tions used in this article is not absolute. In the literature on public support for 
European integration, use of micro- or macro-level models is often determined 
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Table 1.  Summary of economic explanations of public support for European 
integration and EU membership
Criteria Reasons
Main assumption Citizens’ attitudes toward European integration are based on a cost 
/ beneﬁ t analysis of the merits of membership.
Conceptualisation of the 
EU
The EU is an international regime that facilitates economic exchange 
and consequently has important distributional effects for citizens.
Level of analysis and key 
mechanisms tested
MACRO-ECONOMIC EXPLANATIONS
(1) Net EU Budgetary Transfers Model
Citizens who live in member states who are net receivers of EU 
funding will for sociotropic reasons have higher levels of support for 
European integration than citizens in other member states [Carrubba 
1997; Gabel and Whitten 1997; Anderson and Reichert 1996].
(2) Sociotropic Retrospective Model
Collective rather than personal evaluations of economic well-being 
shape attitudes toward the integration project [Gabel and Palmer 
1995; Gabel and Whitten 1997; Gabel 1998a, 1998b, 1998c; Rohr-
schneider 2002; Anderson 1998; Gabel and Palmer 1995; Eichenberg 
and Dalton 1993]. Moreover, support for integration is based on ret-
rospective rather than prospective assessments of national economic 
conditions [Eichenberg and Dalton 1993; Anderson 1998; Christin 
2005]. 
(3) Institutional Ideology Model
Support of integration depends on the form of capitalism present in 
a country. States with a Rhenish capital model will be most favour-
able toward integration [Brinegar, Jolly and Kitschelt 2004; Brinegar 
and Jolly 2005].
MICRO-ECONOMIC EXPLANATIONS
(1) International Trade Liberalisation Model
The EU promotes growth through capital transfers and market lib-
eralisation and this process favours those in economies who possess 
scarce endowments. Typically, within Western Europe integration 
is seen to favour those with higher levels of education and skills 
[Gabel 1998a; Anderson and Reichert 1996; Rodrik 1997; Scheve and 
Slaughter 2001].
(2) Winners and Losers Model
Citizens in post-communist states who have beneﬁ ted from the 
transition process are more likely to support EU accession than those 
who have suffered. Moreover, supporters of the free market in post-
communist states will be most in favour of membership [Tucker et al. 
2002; Doyle and Fidrmuc 2004; Christin 2005].
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by the availability of data. In this article, the categorisation of models such as 
FDI as micro-level reﬂ ects the fact that we have an individual-level survey avail-
able for analysis. This is not to suggest that FDI has only individual-level effects 
and does not have important macro-level effects such as those associated with 
EU budgetary transfers. In the following two sub-sections, a brief outline will be 
given of these micro- and macro-economic perspectives for research on the EU-15 
member states. 
Macro-economic explanations
Explanations of public support based on national economies are based on the 
simple idea that whatever is good for the country is also of beneﬁ t to the individ-
ual. However, the factors and manner in which macro-economic factors inﬂ uence 
attitudes toward European integration has never been deﬁ nitively established. 
This failure stems in part from methodological differences, where the models 
tested, variables used, and countries and time periods examined have varied. 
Consequently, this literature has not provided systematic ﬁ ndings. Here we will 
brieﬂ y review three strands in this research.
Net EU budgetary transfers model
According to this model if a member state is a net recipient of EU funding this will 
improve the infrastructure and services used by citizens [Bosch and Newton 1995; 
Carrubba 1997; Gabel and Whitten 1997; Anderson and Reichert 1996]. Moreover, 
this approach suggests that if a country changes from being a net receiver to be-
ing a net contributor to the EU then popular support for integration should also 
change. If this is the case, ceteris paribus popular support for integration should de-
cline if a country changes from being a recipient to being a contributor to the EU’s 
budget. Ireland represents a case where this change in ﬁ nancial status occurred in 
2007. According to the net budgetary transfers model, popular support for integra-
tion in Ireland should decline after this year. The evidence from Eurobarometer 
data (i.e. the question of whether the country has beneﬁ ted from EU membership) 
(3) Foreign Direct Investment Model
Accession is likely to increase FDI and hence have economic re-
distributional effects creating winners and losers. In capital scarce 
economies FDI will increase employment and training. However, 
increasing levels of foreign ownership may lead to greater public 
controversy and less support for an accession process that is associ-
ated with FDI [Rohrschneider and Whiteﬁ eld 2004].
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reveals that there has been a decline in the perceived beneﬁ ts of EU membership 
in Ireland since 1997 – a full decade before this budgetary change came into effect. 
Such evidence suggests that payments from, or contributions to, the EU are not 
the only considerations used by citizens to assess the integration project.
Sociotropic retrospective model
Many of the economic explanations of mass support for integration emphasise 
that attitudes toward how the national economy has performed, rather than pro-
spective individual level assessments, are the most important. In examining the 
relationship between macro-economic variables and support for the EU, previous 
research has suggested that GDP growth, inﬂ ation, unemployment, and intra-EU 
trade are important. However, the evidence that national economic conditions 
shape public opinion on integration has not always been consistent [Eichenberg 
and Dalton 1993; Duch and Taylor 1997]. For example, we noted earlier that the 
exact effect of macro-economic variables such as level of unemployment and 
inﬂ ation on support for EU membership has been shown to both increase and 
decrease pro-integration opinion [Anderson and Kaltenhaler 1996; Gabel 1998c]. 
Such problems, while stemming in part from methodological differences, prob-
ably also reﬂ ect the fact that citizens’ assessments of national economic perform-
ance are inﬂ uenced by political factors, such as key political events and length of 
membership [Christin and Hug 2002; Bosch and Newton 1995].
Institutional ideology model
Our ﬁ nal explanation contends that national institutions mediate individual evalu-
ations of the economic effects of European integration. In practice this means that 
the institutional ideology and associated preferences of a state have a signiﬁ cant 
effect on transmitting the costs and beneﬁ ts of European integration through mar-
ket liberalisation. Within the EU three ideal types of capitalism may be identiﬁ ed 
– liberal-market capitalism, Rhenish capitalism, and social-democratic capitalism, 
where the liberal-market model is often juxtaposed with the social-democratic one 
in terms of wealth distribution. In this respect, the prevailing argument is that the 
middle ground adopted by the Rhenish model helps explain which form of capi-
talism is most conducive in institutional and ideological terms to mass support for 
integration [Brinegar, Jolly and Kitschelt 2004; Brinegar and Jolly 2005]. From a 
methodological perspective, it can be argued that this approach suffers from endo-
geneity. This is because the states most associated with the historical development 
of European integration from 1957 have been adherents to the Rhenish conception 
of capitalism. In a sense, support for integration is explained in terms of those 
states that have the longest and most successful history of integration. 
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Micro-economic explanations
In the micro-economic approach, support for integration stems from beneﬁ ts that 
accrue to the individual from greater mobility of capital and labour. Much of this 
literature is based on the effects proposed by trade liberalisation theory and more 
speciﬁ cally the Heckscher-Olin model of trade. One of the mechanisms proposed 
to support this perspective is that integration gives higher rewards to those with 
greater human capital resources [Gabel 1998b; Scheve and Slaughter 2001]. This 
occurs via a variety of channels where integration through market liberalisation 
favours those sectors of the economy that have scarcities of either capital or la-
bour. The key point here is that prevailing national or even regional economic 
conditions will give differential incentives to individuals with varying levels of 
age, education, and position within the labour market to support integration. In 
relatively rich countries, individuals who possess capital or high skills will favour 
greater access to markets where capital and skills are scarce. Low skill labour in 
such countries will fear a loss of investment and future jobs prospects, and there-
fore oppose further integration. In contrast, with an abundance of cheap labour 
– a typical feature of less developed economies – workers will favour foreign in-
vestment of capital as it brings with it more employment opportunities. However, 
skilled workers will fear loss of position or perhaps unemployment in a changed 
labour market. One consequence of the twin processes of liberalisation and inte-
gration is the rolling back of the welfare state, a trend that has greater impact on 
those who are more likely to become unemployed. One key feature of liberalising 
markets is the role played by foreign direct investment (FDI). However, to date 
there has been little research on how attitudes toward FDI inﬂ uence orientation 
toward the EU in Western Europe. This is a topic we will return to below.
Economic bases of popular support for EU membership in post-communist 
states
Discussions of public support for accession in post-communist states is intricate-
ly bound up with attitudes toward transition toward a free market economy and 
support for associated liberal democratic institutions, property rights, and wide 
ranging changes in systems of production and social welfare. Although the goal 
of all transition processes has been to improve the welfare of citizens, in most 
post-communist states the costs of transition were often felt before the beneﬁ ts 
[Rose and Haerpfer 1995: 432; Rose, Mischler and Haerpfer 1998: 200]. In this 
respect, citizens in post-communist states when considering the economic effects 
of accession were faced with contemplating what were the likely economic costs 
and beneﬁ ts ensuing from EU membership for citizens. Obviously, there would 
be both winners and losers. In addressing this question, the growing literature on 
public support for European integration and accession in Central and Eastern Eu-
rope has adopted a number of distinct explanations. In general these approaches 
represent extensions of previous research undertaken in Western Europe.
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Macro-economic explanations in Central and Eastern Europe
There has been relatively little systematic comparative research on economic at-
titudes toward European integration in Central and Eastern Europe because of 
data considerations. One intuitive explanation is that post-communist citizens 
supported accession in order to receive structural and Common Agricultural Pol-
icy (CAP) funds from Brussels, i.e. a net budgetary transfer model. 
Another explanation (which may be seen as a variant of the sociotropic ret-
rospective model) as to why aggregated public opinion would express particular 
opinions toward integration is based on the idea that the countries that suffered 
most in the transition process would feel that they have less to lose in transferring 
authority and sovereignty to the EU [Sánchez-Cuenca 2000: 151; Christin 2005: 
39]. In contrast, public opinion in the post-communist states where the transition 
process was relatively successful are expected to be more sceptical of the econom-
ic beneﬁ ts of EU membership. This is because such citizens would have more to 
lose. To summarise, depending on the nature of the transition process, citizens in 
post-communist states living in different national conditions would be expected 
to have different attitudes toward EU membership. Christin [2005: 43–49] has 
found that macro-level factors have the greatest impact on public opinion on the 
EU when national conditions are in ‘bad shape’.
Although the impact of institutional ideology in Western Europe is judged 
in terms of the type of capitalism, the evidence from post-communist states sug-
gests that economic values are important. Particularly within situations of rapid 
political and economic change and hence high uncertainty citizens may fall back 
on regime ideals in assessing the beneﬁ ts of EU membership [Rohrschneider and 
Whiteﬁ eld 2006: 148]. Signiﬁ cantly, in many post-communist states citizens still 
believe in socialist ideals such as an egalitarian society [Evans and Whiteﬁ eld 
1995]. For this reason, economic values may trump instrumental reasoning in 
shaping mass attitudes toward the EU.
Micro-economic explanations in Central and Eastern Europe
In the literature on public opinion toward integration among post-communist 
states at least three different micro-economic approaches have been adopted. 
These models represent a distinct line of research from what came before, because 
of the very different circumstances underpinning the enlargements of 2004 and 
2007. As our focus of interest is public opinion on accession in the Czech Republic, 
we will concentrate in this article on three micro-economic models. Although no 
direct reference is made to expectations for social improvements in this research, 
owing to data limitations, this is not to suggest that such considerations were 
unimportant. Within the Czech Republic there is considerable support for social 
democratic principles. For convenience, in this research, such social welfare-based 
expectations are subsumed under more speciﬁ c micro-economic perspectives. 
socrev2007-1.indb   530 3.9.2007   18:41:27
Pat Lyons: ‘It’s the Economy, Stupid.’ Popular Support for EU Accession in the Czech Republic
531
As this is a single country study, examination of institutional effects is im-
possible, and data for macro-economic analysis are not readily available. There-
fore, in this sub-section there will be a brief presentation of the three models 
reviewed. On this basis some hypotheses will be formulated combined with some 
brief description of the survey questions used to test these hypotheses. More de-
tails of the data used will be given in the next section and in the appendix.
Winners and Losers Model
The ﬁ rst micro-economic model relates speciﬁ cally to Central and Eastern Eu-
rope, where it has been argued that those who have been ‘winners’ in the free 
market reforms in post-communist states such as the Czech Republic will be most 
supportive of integration. In Tucker, Pacek and Berinsky’s [2002] ‘winners and 
losers’ model there are two key explanatory variables explaining support for ac-
cession. 
First, those who have gained from the post-communist transition are more 
likely to support accession than those who have lost.1 In this article, being a win-
ner or loser is based on a summated rating scale of seven items. Four of the items 
relate to the respondents’ own subjective sense of the current economic situation 
of the household and how this has changed over the previous year. In addition, 
the respondents’ assessment of whether their household had sufﬁ cient income 
and whether the household had been able to save in the last ﬁ ve years were used 
as indicators. The last three items refer to objective measures of success – owning 
a video cassette player, owning a car, and having access to the internet (see ap-
pendix for details). 
The second key factor for Tucker, Pacek and Berinsky [2002] is if a respond-
ent is a supporter of the free market. In the survey dataset examined here a better 
measure is available, where it is possible to identify citizens who have a primarily 
free market orientation in contrast to deﬁ ning themselves ﬁ rst and foremost as 
a social democrat, communist, environmentalist, etc. It is also possible to learn 
about respondents’ current feelings toward the Czech economy (on a –100 to +100 
scale) and their prospective view of the Czech economy in ﬁ ve years time (again 
on a –100 to +100 scale). These two ‘thermometer’ type scales are useful in detect-
ing some sense of economic optimism among the public, and how this may be 
associated with attitudes toward accession. Using these survey questions three 
hypotheses regarding the winners and losers model will be tested.
1 Fidrmuc [2000] argues in a similar ‘winners’ and ‘losers’ vein that the former (entrepre-
neurs, white-collar workers, and people with university education) vote for right-wing 
pro-reform parties, while the latter (the unemployed, retired people, blue-collar workers, 
and farm workers) vote for left-wing parties. This analysis shows economic performance 
has a strong impact on electoral choice.
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H.1  Winners in the post-communist transition process will be more supportive 
of EU accession than losers.
H.2  Those citizens who have a primarily free-market orientation will be most 
positive about accession.
H.3  Those who feel positive about the economy at the current time and have 
optimistic expectations for future domestic economic performance will be 
supportive of accession.2
International Trade Liberalisation Model
A more general argument is that a core feature of European integration is the 
liberalisation of trade. According to international trade theory, liberalisation of 
trade is likely to have differential beneﬁ ts for various economic interest groups. 
It is only recently that attempts have been made to use international trade theory 
to explain individual level preferences for transnational processes [Scheve and 
Slaughter 2001]. According to the Heckscher-Ohlin factor proportions theory 
there should be strongest support for freer trade, and by implication accession 
to the EU, among low-skilled workers in national economies that are typiﬁ ed as 
being labour abundant. 
The assumption here is that in comparison to the EU the Czech economy 
has a greater supply of labour than capital. However, within the Czech Repub-
lic there are strong regional differences, measured as relative per capita GDP. It 
is assumed here that this variable is highly correlated with the human capital 
endowments of speciﬁ c regions.3 For this reason, it is more appropriate to treat 
individual preferences based on interests resulting from different human capital 
endowments as being mediated by the effects of the regional economy in which 
a respondent lives. Therefore, an interaction variable of skill by regional per cap-
ita GDP was constructed. The skill level of respondents was measured in terms 
of both education level and occupation [Mayda and Rodrik 2001; O’Rourke and 
Sinnott 2002: 162–5]. However, empirical analysis indicated that the education 
measure yielded more robust results. In addition, the survey examined contains 
a subjective assessment of the willingness of Czech citizens to use the opportu-
2 Previous research supportive of this hypothesis may be found in Anderson [1998] and Rohr-
schneider [2002]. For the accession member states, see Tverdova and Anderson [2004].
3 Within the Czech Republic there are signiﬁ cant regional differences. The Prague Region 
in 2001 had an unemployment rate of 3.7%, and a GDP 2.18 times the national average 
was strongly supportive of accession. In contrast, the relatively well-urbanised Karlovy 
Vary Region (in the northwest of the country, on the German border and a stronghold of 
KSČM (Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia)) had an unemployment rate of 10.1% 
and a GDP level less than four-ﬁ fths of the national average. It was unique in being the 
only region to be against accession in November 2001 [see Kostelecký and Čermák 2004]. 
Markowski and Tucker [2005: 17] make a similar argument with regard to the accession 
referendum in Poland. 
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nities of labour mobility following accession. On the basis of these trade theory 
considerations four hypotheses will be examined.
H.4a  Low-skilled workers in poorer regions of the Czech Republic would have 
been most supportive of EU accession.
H.4b  Medium-skilled workers in relatively rich regions would have been less 
supportive of accession.
H.4c  High-skilled workers in relatively rich regions would have supported ac-
cession.
H.5  Those workers who were most predisposed to work outside the Czech Re-
public in another EU member state would be supportive of the beneﬁ ts of 
mobility offered with accession.
Foreign Direct Investment Model
A key economic impact of European integration is the expected growth of foreign 
direct investment (FDI). Despite the importance of this facet of integration on ac-
cession there has been little research on how public opinion toward FDI might 
shape attitudes toward accession. This is surprising because the issue of foreign 
ownership has been controversial in many post-communist states. Examining the 
link between public support for foreign ownership (a core facet of FDI), Rohrsch-
neider and Whiteﬁ eld [2004] found that support for the latter and having a posi-
tive image of the EU was lower in more democratic states in Central and Eastern 
Europe. Moreover, higher levels of FDI at the national level were associated with 
lower levels of support for foreign ownership. However, national levels of FDI 
had no signiﬁ cant impact on attitudes toward the EU.4 The strategy adopted here 
is different, as use will be made of individual-level subjective measures to assess 
the impact of this variable.
Our expectation is that the economic effects of integration operating through 
FDI will have redistributional consequences, where some groups will be ‘winners’ 
and others will be ‘losers’. Unfortunately, there is little theoretical work specifying 
which domestic interest groups should be most supportive of FDI [Frieden and 
Martin 2002: 128]. What international trade theory does say is that FDI results in 
a complex mix of costs and beneﬁ ts. While FDI can lead to greater investment in 
skills and training of local labour forces much of this beneﬁ t depends on the dif-
ferential technological and productive capacities of foreign and domestic ﬁ rms. If 
there is too great a differential FDI leads to greater inequality between skilled and 
unskilled workers [Blomström et al. 1999; Taylor and Drifﬁ eld 2000]. 
4 Rohrschneider and Whiteﬁ eld [2004: 333] report that their EU model (Table 4) should be 
interpreted with caution as the multi-level estimations may be inﬂ uenced by the smaller 
degrees of freedom of the macro-level variables.
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In political terms, FDI was an important issue because the Czech Republic 
was unique in having virtually no foreign investment between 1948 and 1989. The 
economic policies of the Civic Democrat (ODS) governments from 1992 to 1998 
emphasised domestic rather foreign ownership. These policies were implemented 
through state-owned banks providing funds for domestic ﬁ rms. However, many 
of these ﬁ rms were unviable in a liberalised market. As a result, unemployment 
increased as many domestic companies collapsed. During this period economic 
policy was characterised as ‘under-regulated, under-capitalized … [leading to an] 
… inefﬁ cient private sector dominated by politically connected insider groups’ 
[Hanley 2000: 4]. Nonetheless, the number of foreign businesses in the Czech Re-
public increased ninefold between 1993 and 1997 [Večerník and Matějů 1999: 85].
From 1998 onwards Social Democrat (ČSSD) administrations implemented 
a new set of policies that strongly supported foreign direct investment through 
a system of incentive packages and the construction of industrial parks in areas 
of high unemployment. Despite these two distinct policy periods the Czech Re-
public nonetheless has had one of the highest levels of net FDI inﬂ ows in Central 
and Eastern Europe. According to World Bank Development Indicator data, net 
inﬂ ows of FDI increased from USD 257 million in 1989 to USD 8.23 billion in 2002 
– which represents a thirty-two-fold increase in fourteen years. A central question 
is: what effect did this have on Czech industry?
One of the few studies of the impact of FDI on domestic ﬁ rms found (us-
ing ﬁ rm level panel data between 1994 and 2001) that foreign ﬁ rms did ‘crowd 
out’ domestic Czech ones, but this was a short-term effect. However, success for 
foreign ﬁ rms also increased the likelihood of success for domestic ones where 
increased demand for goods and services within the Czech Republic was the pri-
mary basis for growth. Moreover, technology spillovers primarily aided domestic 
ﬁ rms in high technology industries [Djankov and Hoekman 2000; Kosová 2006]. 
This evidence suggests that FDI may have had some impact on Czech public 
opinion and perhaps attitudes toward EU membership. In this research, support 
for FDI was measured using answers to ﬁ ve different survey items relating to this 
issue (see appendix for details). Consequently, using this data the hypothesis to 
be tested may be formulated as follows.5
H.6  Czech citizens who believed that foreign direct investment (FDI) had a 
positive impact on the national economy would have supported EU mem-
bership as facilitating this process.
5 With six items it was possible to create a summated rating scale with high internal con-
sistency (inter-item correlation, Cronbach alpha = .75) and thereby a superior indicator if 
only a single survey question were used.
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Identity explanations of support for integration
As the process of European integration promotes increasing economic and po-
litical interdependency, one consequence of these developments is a growth in 
multiculturalism while the differences between European nations decline. There-
fore, although membership of the EU creates economic winners and losers there 
is also the possibility that it will ‘provoke a sharp sense of identity loss among 
defenders of the nation’ [McLaren 2002: 553]. However, the relationship between 
national identity (which is seen to be the strongest territorial identity in most Eu-
ropean states) and attitudes toward European integration is not a simple one.
In some research the association between national identity and support for 
the integration project is positive [Citrin and Sides 2004: 170]. This may occur 
because citizens have more than one sense of identity where they feel local, re-
gional, national, and supranational attachments in a manner that is both inclu-
sive and integrative. Thus a variety of case studies suggest that a strong sense of 
identity at one level reinforce a citizen’s sense of identity at other levels [Haesly 
2001; Diez Medrano and Guttiérez 2001]. In contrast, other research suggests a 
negative relationship, because European integration is perceived to be a threat 
to the nation and its culture and values [McLaren 2002; Carey 2002; Christin and 
Trechsel 2002]. Sometimes such fears are crystallised in the association between 
the degree of integration and the level of immigration [Luedtke 2005].
Such scholarship demonstrates that the link between identity and attitudes 
toward the EU are context dependent. An inﬂ uential stream of research suggests 
that how the integration issue is framed in the national context may be critical in es-
tablishing positive or negative associations between national identity and support 
for the EU. For example, if citizens perceive national governance and democratic 
performance positively then there will be a positive link between sense of identity 
and attitudes toward the EU [Sánchez-Cuenca 2000; Rohrschneider 2002].
If we now turn our attention to the nature of national identity in the Czech 
Republic the survey evidence from the national identity modules of the Inter-
national Social Science Project (ISSP) in 1995 and 2003 show important changes. 
These data reveal that Czech national identity declined in some key areas during 
the late 1990s. For example, national identity was most important in 1995, while 
by 2003 community identity had become ascendant. In addition, popular con-
ceptualisations of citizenship shifted from being legalistic to ethno-cultural. Sig-
niﬁ cantly, such changes in key political attitudes were associated with declining 
satisfaction and pride in the performance of the state [Vlachová and Řeháková 
2004: 17–28]. 
Therefore, in the Czech Republic the national context immediately prior to 
accession in June 2003 was one of dissatisfaction with national politics. This situa-
tion resulted on the one hand in a weaker sense of national identity (and sense of 
patriotism) that was in turn associated with being positively pre-disposed toward 
the emergence of a European level of governance. Consequently, Czech citizens 
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with a weak sense of national identity were more likely to support the primacy 
of decisions made at the European rather than national level, even in situations 
of conﬂ ict. Moreover, such citizens were most in favour of a federal Europe [Vla-
chová and Řeháková 2004: 29–31].
On the basis of such empirical evidence and our brief review of the identity 
and integration literature, we may elaborate the following set of three hypotheses 
concerning the link between sense of identity and support for accession in the 
Czech Republic.
H.7a  Those who feared that the EU would lead to a loss of Czech sovereignty 
and that party politics was based on a struggle between national traditions 
and European integration would have opposed accession.
H.7b  Having a belief in defending national interests and feeling proud of Czech 
citizens would be negatively associated with voting for accession because 
of the perceived threat posed by aspects of integration such as loss of inde-
pendence.
H.7c  Citizens with a strong sense of community rather than regional or national 
identity would have been most opposed to EU membership because they 
most acutely perceived European integration to be a threat to their ethno-
cultural values. 
Data and methods
The analysis of public attitudes toward accession in the Czech Republic reported 
here relies on a mass face-to-face survey undertaken by the Public Opinion Re-
search Centre (CVVM – an independent state polling agency) between October 
26 and November 5 in 2001 on 1199 adults aged ﬁ fteen years and older. In this 
research, only a subset of respondents aged seventeen years or older that were 
eligible to vote in the accession referendum of June 2003 are examined (N=1140). 
Like all the main polling agencies in the Czech Republic, CVVM uses quota 
sampling on the basis of region (x8), size of community (x6), sex, age (x4), and ed-
ucation (x4).6 Consequently, with a quota sampling methodology, non-response 
rate and weighting variable estimates are not available (see appendix).7 A central 
concern among survey researchers with data derived from quota-controlled sam-
pling is that the resulting information is problematic owing to non-representative 
strata and non-random selection within strata [Berinsky 2006: 506–9].
6 The numbers in parentheses, e.g. (x4), refer to the number of categories used to create 
quota samples.
7 Two versions of this survey data exist. The ﬁ rst is part of a pooled survey series deposit-
ed at the German Social Archive in Cologne, where all variable labels and documentation 
are in English. The second version is available from CVVM in the Czech language only. 
This dataset has a much more extensive set of variables and is the one used in this paper.
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An analysis of the quality of survey work done by all of the main Czech 
polling agencies prior to the general election of 2002 found that CVVM adheres 
consistently to international polling industry standards. Moreover, the quality of 
the survey data produced by CVVM with regard to measurement validity and ac-
curacy in making pre-election estimates of party support is generally superior to 
all the other main polling agencies within the Czech Republic. As CVVM follows 
standard polling practices and produced the most accurate election predictions 
between 2002 and 2004, this gives us conﬁ dence in the validity and reliability of 
the survey data used in this research [see Kreidl and Lebeda 2003; Krejčí 2004].
Turning now to the survey question used as the dependent variable in this 
research, we can see from the following item wording that those interviewed 
were offered four response options. ‘If there were a referendum tomorrow on 
the Czech Republic’s accession to the European Union, would you vote for or 
against accession?’ The response options were: ‘for’, ‘against’, ‘would not vote’, 
‘undecided’ and ‘don’t know’.
Following a similar strategy as Tucker, Pacek and Berinsky [2002] the sub-
stantively similar responses of ‘undecided’ and ‘don’t know’ were combined.8 
The theoretical expectation is that the individuals who responded, ‘for’, ‘against’, 
‘would not vote’, or ‘undecided/don’t know’ would be different. A series of Wald 
and likelihood ratio tests were used to investigate and conﬁ rm that combining 
any of these response options is not warranted. 
As the dependent variable is unordered and nominal, a multinomial logit 
(MNL) modelling strategy was used to analyse the survey data [Scott-Long 1997: 
151–178]. It should be noted that all the data, except the dependent variable, were 
rescaled (0–1) to aid interpretation. Therefore, as all measures have the same met-
ric, those variables with larger coefﬁ cients in the same models presented have 
stronger effects. 
However, logit regression coefﬁ cients are difﬁ cult to interpret because they 
are non-linear. Technically this means that while a change in the log odds ratio 
is constant for all levels across all variables, the value of discrete probabilities 
depends critically on the values of the variables. For example, the effect of being 
a winner in the post-communist transition process might increase the odds of 
supporting EU membership by a factor of ten, but the impact of an economic as-
sessment is small if the odds of supporting accession were one in seven thousand. 
Therefore, in order to make the presentation of our MNL regression results more 
transparent some of the estimates will be presented within the next section as 
predicted probabilities and graphically. 
8 There is the temptation here to combine non-voting and uncommitted respondents. 
However, care has to be taken when combining response categories. For example, Tucker, 
Pacek and Berinsky [2002: 561] argue that Cichowski’s [2000: 1255] strategy of combining 
undecided and non-voting respondents yielded misleading results. 
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Empirical results
One important implication of the research results presented here is that the EU 
accession campaign may have had little effect in changing the minds of voters.9 
Eighteen months before the referendum poll, 44% of people supported accession 
while 14% were against. In the referendum of mid-June 2003, 42% of registered 
voters voted ‘yes’ while 12% voted ‘no’, with a turnout rate of 55%. The Novem-
ber 2001 survey results are within sampling error (± 3%) of the actual referendum 
result.10 
Taking those respondents, aged seventeen years or more (and hence eligible 
voters in June 2003), who were ‘undecided’ (28%), ‘would not vote’ (6%), and had 
no opinion (9%), it is possible to account for most of the non-voters in the refer-
endum 45% (42%). The assumption here is that those voters who gave no ﬁ rm 
opinions in late 2001 were most likely to abstain in the accession referendum. 
Many of the differences between the poll of late 2001 and the exit poll for 
the accession referendum shown in Table 2 relate to the impact of turnout. In the 
survey of late 2001 many more younger and middle-aged people stated that they 
would vote than were interviewed after voting in the exit poll. Differential turn-
out on the basis of age is a well-known feature in all elections. 
Furthermore, a higher turnout rate in the exit poll among those with an el-
ementary education than that estimated by the poll of late 2001 is not surprising 
[see Rosenstone and Hansen 1993; Wolﬁ nger and Rosenstone 1980]. This effect 
is partly based on age as a higher proportion of senior citizens received only an 
elementary education, in addition many of this group live in rural areas with 
strong social networks that foster the norm that voting is a civic duty. The most 
interesting differences are those relating to the unemployed who appear to have 
been convinced between November 2001 and June 2003 to vote ‘yes’. Table 2 in-
dicates that unemployed citizens’ support for accession grew by almost 48% dur-
ing this period. Equally dramatic was the growth in support among voters of the 
Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia (KSČM) for EU membership, which 
went up by almost 95%. However, these results may be more apparent than real 
owing to social desirability effects in survey interviews [Tourangeau, Rips and 
Rasinski 2000]. 
It is well known internationally that the number of respondents who will 
admit to being unemployed is often much less than those registered as being un-
employed. In the Czech Republic there was an ofﬁ cial unemployment rate of 9.8% 
9 Hanley [2004: 710] notes that the ‘yes’ campaign dominated the ‘no’ one. In terms of ﬁ -
nances the ‘yes’ campaign spent two hundred times more money than the ‘no’ side, which 
was in addition considered to be ineffective. For many, accession was considered a fait 
accompli prior to the referendum. The acrimonious debates during the campaign were less 
about accession and more concerned with the nature of integration and its impact on the 
Czech Republic.
10 Lebeda [2004: 219–221] shows that ﬁ nal polls before the referendum (i.e. June 2003) were 
also reasonably accurate in predicting both turnout and support for accession.
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Table 2.  Comparison of the October–November 2001 survey and the exit poll results in 
June 2003 (%)
Oct.–Nov. 2001
Yes
Exit Poll, 
June 2003
Yes
Difference
Oct.–Nov. 2001 
– June 2003
Gender
    Male 76 77 –1
    Female 75 78 –3
Age
    18–29 yrs. 89 78 +9
    30–44 yrs. 83 75 +8
    45–59 yrs. 67 77 –10
    60+ yrs. 65 79 –14
Education (highest level)
    Elementary 64 73 –9
    High school diploma 81 79 +2
    University 86 82 +4
Occupation
    Employees 80 77 +3
    Business owners 79 79 0
    Students 91 84 +7
    Retired 60 78 –18
    Housewives 82 75 +7
    Unemployed 44 65 –21
Party (vote intention)
    US-DEU 89 92 –2
    ODS 91 86 +5
    KDU-ČSL 89 84 +5
    ČSSD 76 82 –6
    KSČM 19 37 –18
TOTAL (%) 75 78 –3
N 663 ≈12 500
Note: The difference in the column estimates relate to how much the estimates from the 
survey in late 2001 were over or under the results of the exit poll on 13–14 June 2003. Per-
centages here refer to those who voted or stated that they would deﬁ nitely vote ‘yes’. 
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Table 3.  Cross-tabulation of preferences for EU membership by attitudes toward 
the economy and identity (%)
Row (%)
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All respondents 14 44 36 6 1140 100
Winners & Losers Model
Loser in the post-communist 
transition process 17 34 42 7 805 71
Winner in the post-communist 
transition process 8 67 23 2 335 29
Free market orientation – no 17 36 40 7 877 77
Free market orientation – yes 5 71 23 1 263 23
Feelings toward current economic 
system in Czech Republic – other 20 25 47 8 407 36
Feelings toward current economic 
system in Czech Republic 
– positive
11 54 31 4 733 64
Feelings toward economic system 
in Czech Republic in 5 yrs. – other 20 24 48 8 418 37
Feelings toward economic system 
in Czech Republic in 5 yrs. 
– positive
11 55 30 4 722 63
International Trade Model
Low-skill worker in a region with 
a lower than mean per capita GDP 14 48 35 4 883 77
Low-skill worker in a region with a 
higher than mean per capita GDP 17 30 42 11 257 23
Medium-skill worker in a region with 
a lower than mean per capita GDP 15 41 38 7 870 76
Medium-skill worker in a region with 
a higher than mean per capita GDP 13 54 31 1 270 24
High-skill worker in a region with 
a lower than mean per capita GDP 15 41 38 6 1027 90
High-skill worker in a region with 
a higher than mean per capita GDP 11 65 23 1 113 10
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Willing to work outside Czech 
Republic after accession – 
uncommitted
16 40 38 6 986 86
Willing to work outside Czech 
Republic after accession – yes 3 70 23 5 154 14
FDI Model
Some doubts about foreign direct 
investment in Czech Republic 22 25 44 8 710 62
Convinced supporter of foreign 
direct investment in Czech Republic 2 74 23 1 430 38
Identity Model
EU membership will lead to a loss of 
sovereignty 13 44 37 6 925 81
EU membership will not lead to 
a loss of sovereignty 20 44 33 4 215 19
Believe in defending national 
interests – uncommitted response 13 46 35 6 986 86
Believe in defending national 
interests – yes 21 30 45 5 154 14
Very proud of Czech citizens 
– uncommitted response 13 43 38 6 902 79
Very proud of Czech citizens – yes 18 48 30 4 238 21
Party politics is based on national 
traditions vs. EU interests – no 14 44 37 6 1099 96
Party politics is based on national 
traditions vs. EU interests – yes 27 41 27 5 41 4
Identiﬁ es with local community – no 14 48 34 5 498 44
Identiﬁ es with local community – yes 15 41 38 6 642 56
Identiﬁ es with region – no 14 43 37 6 985 86
Identiﬁ es with region – yes 14 48 35 4 155 14
Identiﬁ es with country – no 14 42 37 6 922 81
Identiﬁ es with country – yes 15 50 32 3 218 19
Note: Row percentages (to the left of the number of cases) represent the distribution of 
responses on EU accession for each variable, e.g. 34% of those who were losers in the 
post-communist transition process favour EU accession. Column percentages (to the 
right of the number of cases) refer to how much each response option constituted of 
the total sample, e.g. 71% felt they were losers in the post-communist transition process 
while 29% were winners. Numbers in bold refer to estimates that signiﬁ cantly (p≤.05) 
exceed those of the total electorate, e.g. losers in the post-communist transition process 
were signiﬁ cantly more likely than all voters to state they were undecided about voting 
in the accession referendum.
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for December 2001, but the survey estimate was just 4%. Similarly, the attenuation 
effects due to social desirability were also evident for the intention to vote for the 
Communist Party or for feeling closest to this party – where in the survey of late 
2001 it had an 11% level of support. Seven months later, in the 2002 general elec-
tions, the Communist Party attracted 18.5% of the popular vote. The differences 
between the survey used here and the exit poll are in large part the result of well-
known methodological artefacts and do not point to strong campaign effects for 
these speciﬁ c groups. 
Given the wide range of questions asked in the survey examined in this 
paper, it is a unique and invaluable instrument for estimating ‘core’ popular sup-
port for accession beyond the short-term effects of a campaign – which in the 
Czech case may have had its greatest impact in ensuring a level of voter turnout 
comparable with the previous general election in 2002. While this was important 
in ensuring legitimacy in the decision to join the EU, it was not as crucial a consid-
eration as in Poland and Slovakia, which had participation thresholds for having 
binding referendum results.
Before describing the results of our regression models it is instructive ﬁ rst 
to examine a simple proﬁ le of preferences for accession by attitudes toward the 
economy. The cross-tabulations and difference of proportions estimates present-
ed in Table 3 suggest that economic attitudes were more strongly linked with 
opinions on accession than those related to sense of identity. Many of the patterns 
evident in Table 3 are consonant with our hypotheses, and we will discuss these 
in greater detail in the following subsections. 
However, Table 3 is important, as it provides us with estimates (in the ﬁ nal 
column on the right) of the frequency distributions of all variables used in the mod-
els reported later in Table 4. Such data is important, as they facilitate the assessment 
of the signiﬁ cance of the regression results. For example, it is important to know 
that seven in ten respondents felt they were losers in the post-communist transition 
process and that such perceptions among the majority of the electorate translated 
into indecision about the beneﬁ ts of accession rather than into opposition.
Winners and Losers Model
As the ﬁ rst column of Table 4 shows, each of the predicted effects of Tucker, Pacek 
and Berinsky’s [2002] model was found to be statistically signiﬁ cant. Being a 
‘winner’ in the post-communist transition (H.1) process increased the probability 
(p=+.48) that a respondent would state that they would support accession rather 
than vote ‘no’ (p=–.08) in the referendum.11 Moreover, self-identiﬁ ed winners in 
the post-communist transition process in contrast to losers were much less apt 
11 The probabilities reported refer to the change in probability for giving a ‘yes’ (or ‘no’, 
‘don’t know’ or ‘will not vote’) response to the EU accession question across the entire 
range of the independent variable. For example, the probability of supporting accession 
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(p=–.39) to say ‘don’t know’ and were very unlikely (p<.001) to state that they 
would not vote in the referendum. Ideologically, those who identiﬁ ed themselves 
as having a free market orientation (H.2) were more likely (p=.16) to be in favour 
of accession, indicating a strong association in citizens’ minds between the inte-
gration process and market liberalisation. 
A positive assessment of the national economy (H.3a) and being optimistic 
about the future (H.3b) were also signiﬁ cant factors but their effects were less 
powerful than the other variables in the winners and losers model. Theoretically 
one might have expected the prospective economic measure to have had the most 
powerful impact, as the beneﬁ ts of accession were a future goal. For Czech citi-
zens, current and prospective assessments of the economy were moderately cor-
related (r=.47), which might be the result of a question ordering or priming effect, 
as the two items were sequential in the survey.
International Trade Liberalisation Model
Like Gabel’s [1998b] economic interest and political preference model, the in-
ternational trade liberalisation approach is based on insights derived from the 
Heckscher-Ohlin theory of international trade preferences. However, the explan-
atory variables used are somewhat different. Gabel created an interaction vari-
able using occupation and relative wages / human capital. In contrast, the trade 
liberalisation model implemented here focuses on the differential impact that re-
gional (rather than cross-national) economic structures will have on preferences 
for accession.12 In addition, the model tested in this research takes into account 
labour mobility (i.e. migration to Prague from regions of industrial decline), a key 
consideration in trade theory. 
Using education level as a measure of worker skill proved to be more robust 
than using income. The results shown in the second column of Table 4 show that 
skilled labour in rich regions was most strongly associated with support for acces-
sion. Therefore, in line with our expectations (H.4a) low-skilled workers in richer 
regions tended to be against accession, though this is not a statistically signiﬁ cant 
effect. In contrast, those with medium and high skills (H.4b-c) were increasingly 
likely to give a ‘yes’ (p=+.18 and +.25 respectively) rather than a ‘no’ response 
(p=–.05 and –.07 respectively).13 These results match the ﬁ ndings of Gabel’s [1998a] 
analysis of mass attitudes with EU-12 member states toward membership between 
increases by .48 (or 48%) across the entire range of our 8-point ‘winners-losers’ ordinal 
variable.
12 It should be noted that the interpretation of interaction terms in nonlinear models re-
quires considerable care [see Ai and Norton 2003; Brambor, Clark and Golder 2006; and 
Berry, Esarey and Rubin 2007].
13 Additional tests of these interaction variables using a methodology developed by Bram-
bor, Clark and Golder [2006] conﬁ rm the results noted in Table 4. Models including all 
interaction variables are not reported for reasons of brevity.
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1975 and 1992. If the Heckscher-Ohlin logic is correct these results suggest that the 
pattern of public opinion in the Czech economy is better typiﬁ ed as one stemming 
from a capital-rich rather than a labour-abundant economy.
Turning our attention now to the willingness of workers to take advantage 
of the opportunity to work outside of the Czech Republic in another EU member 
state, we ﬁ nd that a willingness to work elsewhere in the EU following member-
ship (H.5) increased the likelihood of voting for accession considerably (p=+.38) 
and reduced the probability of giving an uncommitted answer (p=–.17). This 
free movement of labour variable is in fact the most powerful factor identiﬁ ed in 
our trade liberalisation model and represents an interesting extension of Gabel’s 
[1998a] work.
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) Model
The results shown in the third column of Table 4 indicate that positive attitudes 
toward the economic beneﬁ ts of FDI (as predicted in H.6) are strongly correlated 
with support for accession. According to the estimated model, respondents who 
Figure 1.  Probability of supporting, opposing, being uncommitted, or not voting in 
the accession referendum by support for foreign direct investment (FDI)
Note: The scores for FDI indicate low support (0) or high support (1). The predicted prob-
abilities relate to the likelihood of giving a speciﬁ c response for a given level of support for 
FDI. Predicted probabilities calculated using a procedure developed by Tomz et al. [2003].
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favoured foreign direct investment in the Czech Republic were much more likely 
to say they would vote ‘yes’ (p=+.84) than vote ‘no’ (p=–.37). Moreover, as Fig-
ure 1 demonstrates these pro-FDI respondents were also unlikely to give a non-
committal or ‘would not vote’ response. 
The association between seeing ‘positive beneﬁ ts for EU membership’ and 
being supportive of FDI is very high (eta=.70). It is interesting to note that there 
are less strong statistical associations between FDI and being an economic winner 
from the post-communist transition (tau b=.34) or having a free market orienta-
tion (tau b=.35). Such bivariate analyses suggest that in the minds of Czech citi-
zens FDI was strongly associated with the beneﬁ ts of EU membership. 
In sum, accession meant investment and consequently increased employ-
ment opportunities. However, these beneﬁ ts were likely only to accrue directly 
to those working in foreign ﬁ rms and those employed in domestic industries us-
ing advanced technologies and more particularly those working in the services 
rather than manufacturing sectors [Ayyagari and Kosová 2006]. While we have 
insufﬁ cient survey data to test these occupational differences, the general picture 
is one where overall public opinion in late 2001 judged FDI policies to be a suc-
cess, and that accession to the EU would further this virtuous cycle of increased 
competitiveness and employment.
Combined Micro-Economic Explanation Model
Looking at a combined micro-economic model, in the fourth column of Table 4 
the most salient feature is the strong impact that FDI had on support for accession 
along with willingness to pursue employment opportunities elsewhere in the EU. 
The impact of attitudes toward FDI is quite impressive and is more apparent in a 
graphical presentation of the model estimates. Figure 1 reveals that the probabil-
ity of supporting accession increases from 10 to 87% as a respondent moves from 
being against FDI to being fully supportive of it.14 
In contrast, Figure 2 shows that the impact of being positive about the op-
portunities of increased labour mobility with accession is much less pronounced. 
Those who were certain that they would not look for employment outside the 
Czech Republic after EU membership were not strongly against accession. More-
over, those individuals who were very likely to look for work outside of the Czech 
Republic within the EU were split in a ratio of 5 to 4 in favour of accession or not 
expressing an opinion. 
14 The predicted probabilities in Figures 3 and 4 were calculated using a stochastic simula-
tion procedure implemented using Clarify 2.1 module within STATA 9.1 [King, Tomz and 
Wittenberg 2000; Tomz, Wittenberg and King 2003]. Where appropriate, all independent 
and control variables were held at their mean values or set to zero in the case of dummy 
variables. Household income was set to its modal value. The reported probabilities are the 
mean of one thousand (Monte Carlo simulation) estimations.
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The exact source of such ambivalence is difﬁ cult to determine. There was no 
public discussion in late 2001 about EU-15 member states restricting the mobility 
of Czech workers following accession. Arguments that Czechs may have been 
doubtful about the likelihood of completely free movement of labour following 
accession are therefore difﬁ cult to sustain on the basis of the contemporary evi-
dence.
This suggests that a key economic reason for supporting accession in the 
Czech Republic related to employment. Signiﬁ cantly, the economic logic implied 
by the Heckscher-Ohlin theory highlighting the differences between different 
(skilled) segments of the labour force seems to have been less important than 
attitudinal factors. Moreover, although Tucker, Pacek and Berinsky’s [2002] ‘win-
ners and losers’ model does help to explain popular support for accession in the 
Czech Republic, it is not as powerful an explanation as those variables (i.e. FDI 
and labour mobility) that relate to future business and employment opportuni-
ties. 
Figure 2. Probability of supporting, opposing, being uncommitted, or not voting in 
the accession referendum by willingness to work elsewhere within the EU 
following accession
Note: The scores for willing to work (outside the Czech Republic) within the EU follow-
ing accession indicate low likelihood (0) or high likelihood (1). The predicted probabili-
ties relate to the likelihood of giving a speciﬁ c response for a given level of support for 
willingness to seek work opportunities within the EU following accession. Predicted 
probabilities calculated using a procedure developed by Tomz et al. [2003].
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However, the variables in our winners and losers model have more power-
ful effects in explaining when respondents were likely to state that they would 
vote ‘yes’ rather than say ‘don’t know’ or ‘will not vote’. In short, the winners 
and losers model would appear primarily to refer to whether Czech citizens were 
interested or engaged in the accession issue. Attitudes toward current and fu-
ture general economic prospects exhibited similar characteristics. Having exam-
ined in some detail the micro-economic explanations of support for accession, 
it is important to evaluate a competing explanation of mass orientations toward 
the EU.
Identity Model
In our identity model we included variables for national and sub-national (lo-
cal area and region) territorial attachments. Moreover, the identity model also 
includes items capturing perceived threats to national interests and a loss of sov-
ereignty. Details of these variables are given in the appendix. This set of seven 
variables represents a useful collection of measures to evaluate many of the key 
themes highlighted in previous research assessing the link between identity and 
attitudes toward the EU. Preliminary summated rating scale analysis reveals that 
this group of items do not refer to a single identity scale as the average inter-item 
correlation is rather low (r=.04). Moreover, this analysis shows that loss of sover-
eignty, defending national interests, and local identity are negatively correlated 
with national pride and identity at the regional and national levels. 
Such results suggest that sense of identity in the Czech Republic and at-
titudes toward the EU are dependent on the primary level of identity felt by the 
citizen. If the respondent had a strong sense of local identity they were likely 
to be less in favour of accession than those with a higher territorial attachment. 
The coefﬁ cients presented in the penultimate column concur with the basic logic 
expressed in H.7c. However, the evidence presented in Table 3 suggests that level 
of identity is not likely to be statistically important in explaining variation in 
support for accession. This is conﬁ rmed in the results presented in column 5 of 
Table 4.
In fact, the results presented in Table 4 conﬁ rm the remaining two hypoth-
eses for the identity model (H.7a, and the ﬁ rst part of H.7b). The main impact of 
having a ‘defend the national interest’ orientation was to increase the probability 
of voting ‘no’ (p=+.16) or replying ‘don’t know’ (p=+.09). If we examine Figure 
3 we see that the overall effect of this variable is to reduce support for accession 
(p=+.16), or replying ‘don’t know’ (p=+.09). However, these effects in comparison 
to those noted earlier for FDI are relatively weak. 
In contrast, the primary effects of thinking of accession as involving a loss of 
sovereignty or seeing party politics as a defence of national interests against the 
EU was to motivate the expression of deﬁ nite rather than non-committal respons-
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es. However, having these opinions did not dramatically increase the probability 
of being negative toward accession (p=+.01 and +.02 respectively).15 
In overall terms, the identity model fails to explain much of the variation in 
Czech support for accession (R-squared=.09) for two main reasons: (a) variables 
such as loss of identity were not strongly associated with intended vote choice in 
the accession referendum, and (b) many of the other variables of interest involved 
small numbers of cases resulting in coefﬁ cients with the hypothesised effects in 
Table 4 though lacking signiﬁ cance. In our ﬁ nal set of analyses, we will endeav-
our to assess whether economic or identity factors had the most powerful effects 
on shaping preferences in the Czech accession referendum.
15 It should be noted that this group of respondents constituted less than 4% (n=41) of the 
total sample. Therefore, these effects are of more interest in terms of a future Eurosceptic 
orientation among Czech voters.
Figure 3.  Probability of supporting, opposing, being uncommitted, or not voting in 
the accession referendum by belief that party politics is primarily shaped by 
national traditions versus EU interests
Note: The scores for the belief that party politics is shaped by national traditions vs. EU 
interests indicate low belief in this cleavage (0) or strong belief (1). The predicted prob-
abilities relate to the likelihood of giving a speciﬁ c response for a given level of belief that 
party politics is primarily shaped by national traditions vs. EU interests. Predicted prob-
abilities calculated using a procedure developed by Tomz et al. [2003].
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Is identity more important than economics?
Previous research which has examined if economic or national identity consid-
erations have a stronger impact on public opinion toward the EU found that iden-
tity was more important [Hooghe and Marks 2004, 2005]. This was the situation 
within the EU-15 member states in 2002. With regard to the 2004 accession states 
there is insufﬁ cient research to demonstrate if a similar pattern prevails. How-
ever, as noted earlier Rohrschneider and Whiteﬁ eld [2004, 2006: 147] using survey 
data from the 1990s have argued that public opinion on the EU in post-commu-
nist states is better explained by political and economic values than by instrumen-
tal economic considerations. Here we will explore whether identity rather than 
economics was the driving force behind support, or opposition to accession in 
the Czech Republic.
In our ﬁ nal model, we test a combined economic and identity model with 
the goal of observing which speciﬁ c variables retain signiﬁ cance. This facilitates 
testing which variables from our various economic and identity models have the 
greatest impact in explaining variation in preferences for accession. The multino-
mial logistic regression analysis shown in the ﬁ nal column of Table 4 reveals that 
our economic variables remain the strongest predictors of support for accession. 
The only identity model measure to exhibit a similar level of signiﬁ cance was the 
item related to perceiving party politics in terms of ‘national traditions vs. EU 
interests’. Those who saw party politics in this manner were, as expected, more 
likely to vote against accession (p=+.13). 
Using information measures of model performance it is possible to investi-
gate which model provides the ‘best’ ﬁ t. Using the Akaike information criterion 
(AIC) or the Bayesian information criterion (BIC) the model with the smallest 
value is considered to be the most superior. The results presented at the very bot-
tom of Table 4 demonstrate that the full economic model outperforms the iden-
tity model by a considerable margin. Moreover, the best individual model of the 
six tested is the FDI explanation. In contrast, the identity model provides the 
poorest explanation of all the models tested. Therefore, it is clear that economics 
was more important than identity for Czech voters in considering how to vote in 
the accession referendum.
Conclusion
In this article we have examined how economic factors inﬂ uence citizen sup-
port for European integration. We have seen that mass support for integration 
involves consideration of two debates: a) Which is more important in explain-
ing mass support for accession – instrumental economic preferences or identity-
based considerations? b) Do models of mass support for integration developed 
in Western Europe also apply in Central and Eastern Europe? In reviewing the 
literature surrounding both of these debates it is obvious that further empirical 
research is required. 
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The evidence presented in this article has shown with regard to the ﬁ rst de-
bate that within the Czech Republic in late 2001 economics was more important 
than identity in explaining support for EU membership. This is not to suggest 
that concerns over loss of sovereignty, fears about defending national interests, 
or perceiving politics as revolving around a national tradition versus EU interest 
axis were not important. Rather they were very much less important in explain-
ing support for accession than economic considerations.
With regard to the second debate the evidence presented shows that models 
of mass support for integration developed over the last three decades in Western 
Europe do have application in countries such as the Czech Republic. Our brief 
literature review revealed that there are no deﬁ nitive economic models of what 
drives mass support for integration. Rather there are different types of economic 
explanations. In this article, we have shown with regard to conditions prevailing 
in one country in Central and Eastern Europe the importance of economic con-
siderations as a motivating factor in explaining individual level support for EU 
membership.
The results presented illustrate that the inﬂ uential ‘winners and losers’ ex-
planation of support for integration was less important than attitudes toward FDI 
in the Czech Republic. However, this difference warns us of the importance of i) 
timing and ii) choice of dependent variable. Different research results relating to 
vague proposals for future accession, vote choice in a future referendum, and at-
titudes toward integration post accession undoubtedly refer to qualitatively dif-
ferent things for respondents. 
Now that the citizens of Eastern and Western Europe live within the EU 
we are in a better position to compare ‘like with like’ and hence develop pan-
European explanations of mass support for integration. In this respect, some of 
the results presented would seem to support Eichenberg and Dalton’s [1993: 510] 
proposition that if the EU ‘has promised anything, it has promised the enhance-
ment of member states’ economic welfare’. Of course, the quip ‘it’s the economy, 
stupid’ represents only one aspect of how citizens evaluate the integration proc-
ess. However, it is economics that has most often been used to ‘sell’ the European 
project during successive enlargements. Therefore, it seems sensible to think that 
it will inform attitudes toward the beneﬁ ts of continued EU membership.
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Appendix
The analysis of public attitudes toward accession in the Czech Republic relies on 
a mass survey ﬁ elded in late October 26 and early November 5 2001 – eighteen 
months before the referendum in mid-June 2003. This survey was managed by the 
Centre for Public Opinion Research (CVVM). This is a specialised section within 
the Institute of Sociology of the Academy of Sciences of the Czech Republic. This 
survey has a typical methodology for this series of opinion polls. This national 
face-to-face national survey interviewed 1199 adults aged ﬁ fteen years and older 
using quota sampling on the basis of region, size of community, sex, age, and 
education. There were almost two hundred interviewers (n=193) who undertook 
an average of six interviews each. In the analysis in this paper, respondents aged 
seventeen years and under were excluded, as they would not have been eligible 
to vote in June 2003. This leaves a sample size of 1140. The sample is representa-
tive of the entire territory of the Czech Republic with a mean of 16 interviews 
undertaken in each Primary Sampling Unit (PSU) – the district (okres) (n=71). The 
response rate for this survey is unknown. No weighting variables were produced 
to reﬂ ect, for example the size of the household from which a respondent was 
selected. Two versions of this survey data exist. The ﬁ rst is part of a pooled survey 
series deposited at the German Social Data Archive, Cologne, where all variable 
labels and documentation are in English. The second version is available from 
CVVM in the Czech language only. This dataset has a much more extensive set of 
variables and is the one used in this paper. 
Independent Variables
Winners and Losers Model
Winner in the post-communism transition process
A summated rating scale was derived from the following seven survey items. 
For brevity only those options of direct interest are reported. (1) positive rating 
of current economic situation of the household, (2) good household economic 
situation in ﬁ ve years time, (3) household has sufﬁ cient income, (4) household 
has been able to save in the last ﬁ ve years, (5) the household has a video cassette 
recorder, (6) the household owns a car, (7) the respondent has access to the inter-
net. This scale has a Cronbach alpha of .70.
Free market orientation
Which general political attitude do you most strongly support? The respondent 
was only allowed to pick one option from a set of ﬁ ve or reply other, none or don’t 
know. (1) Pro market.
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Positive feelings toward current economic system / economic situation in ﬁ ve years
I would like to show you an evaluation scale on how well the economy functions. 
The best score is plus 100 and is on the top end of the scale; the worst score is mi-
nus 100 and is at the bottom of the scale. (b) Please locate on this scale our current 
economic system. (c) Please locate on this scale our economic system in ﬁ ve years. 
Non-committal responses were coded to the midpoint of the scale, i.e. zero.
International Trade Liberalisation Model
Skill level of the respondent * relative GDP per capita in region
Skill of respondent as indicated by level of education (elementary, secondary or 
university). Incomplete secondary education is the reference category. Each of 
these variables was used to create an interaction variable with the relative per 
capita GDP of the region (kraj) where a respondent lives. The GDP data for 2001 
is taken from ﬁ gures published by the Czech Statistical Ofﬁ ce.
Willing to work outside the CR after accession
Are you personally interested in working in one of the EU member countries 
after the Czech Republic joins the EU?  This item had seven response options: 
(a) Yes, will deﬁ nitely try; (b) Yes, might try; (c) Would be interested if offered a 
job; (d) It’s too early to say; (e) No, probably will not be interested; (f) No deﬁ -
nitely not interested; (g) Don’t know. The few don’t know responses (n=40) were 
recoded to the modal category – option (e). Recoded 1=1, else=0.
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) Model
A summated rating scale constructed from a series of ﬁ ve items asked in sequence 
on various aspects of foreign direct investment (FDI). Respondents were given a 
number of options. For brevity only those of interest are reported here. (1) Foreign 
direct investment makes the economy better; (2) Foreign direct investment builds 
up new companies, which helps the Czech economy; (3) Czech govt. should not 
support Czech companies to retain market share; (4) Czech govt. should encour-
age foreign investment in Czech companies; (5) State authorities should encour-
age foreign direct investment. The most positive response was coded as 1 else 0 
to capture support for foreign direct investment. This scale has a Cronbach alpha 
of .75.
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Identity Model
Do you think that Czech membership in the EU will bring … (d) EU membership 
will bring no loss of sovereignty
Which general political attitude do you most strongly support?  The re-
spondent was only allowed to pick one option from a set of ﬁ ve, or reply other, 
none, or don’t know. (4) Defend national interests.
Are you proud of the country’s citizens? (1) Very proud, (2) Somewhat 
proud, (3) Not proud, (4) Not at all proud, (5) Don’t know. Recoded 1=1, else=0.
I am going to show you some reasons where people allege there are differ-
ences between political parties in our country. Which of the following statements 
best represents these differences? (6) Some political parties support national tra-
dition, while others stress the merits of European integration.
Which of the following options do you most closely identify with? And 
which option do you identify with secondly? (1) Local community or town where 
you live, (2) Region, (3) Country, (4) Europe, (5) Other, (6) Don’t know. Please note 
that for this research only the ﬁ rst options were used.
Control Variables
Control variables are not reported because of (a) space constraints and (b) they 
are not the primary focus of the models presented.
Female (coded as 1)
Only those eligible to vote in the referendum in June 2003 were included, 17yrs+
Level of urbanisation of a region, taken from Czech Statistical Ofﬁ ce (2001)
Respondent works in a state owned enterprise
Respondent works in the state bureaucracy / civil service
Respondent works in the private sector in a Czech-owned business
Respondent works in the private sector in a foreign-owned business
Respondent is unemployed
Household income < 499 CZK per month (third category used as base)
Household income 500-1999 CZK per month
Household income 5000-19 999 CZK per month
Household income 20 000-99 999 CZK per month
Household income 100 000+ CZK per month
Level of religious belief (atheist, agnostic, believe in god)
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All regions, except Prague (n=13) were included as dummy variables to cap-
ture any variance not dealt with by the other regional variables such as urbanisa-
tion. Apart from the need for a reference regional variable, preliminary analysis 
also indicated that using a single Prague region variable resulted in collinearity 
with a number of other variables, such as income, urbanisation, and unemploy-
ment. In preliminary models each region’s relative per capita GDP was included 
as a separate variable, but these variables had insigniﬁ cant effects. Level of edu-
cation is not used as control variable, as it was used to measure the skill level of 
the respondent.
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